On sustaining cooperation without public observations

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2867zbMath1019.91008OpenAlexW1988505653MaRDI QIDQ1604521

Olivier Compte

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2867

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesrepeated gamessignaling and communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ Plausible cooperation ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

Cites Work

• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Commitment and observability in games
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

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