On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2868zbMath1008.91009OpenAlexW2015917145MaRDI QIDQ1604522

Olivier Compte

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2868

zbMATH Keywords

perturbationequilibriummutual minmax

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (9)

Foundation of quantum optimal transport and applications ⋮ Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring ⋮ Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Moral hazard and private monitoring ⋮ Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ On sustaining cooperation without public observations ⋮ Repeated games with almost-public monitoring ⋮ Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

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• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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