Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2711zbMath1021.91017OpenAlexW2090715250MaRDI QIDQ1604524

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 4 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8487a7c7471780fe03f310d3aa20af26cab6a841

zbMATH Keywords

correlationrepeated gameprivate monitoringsecret price cutting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (9)

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring

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