Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1160zbMath1050.91075OpenAlexW2040780817MaRDI QIDQ1604641

Okmyung Bin, Stephen Polasky

Publication date: 8 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1160

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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