An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game.
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Publication:1605199
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00077-XzbMath1100.91505MaRDI QIDQ1605199
Peter A. Zadrozny, Baoline Chen
Publication date: 15 July 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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