Cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00080-XzbMath1100.91504MaRDI QIDQ1605204

Francisco Alvarez Gonzalez, Christophe Deissenberg

Publication date: 15 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Reinforcement learningReputationCredibilityTime inconsistencyKydland--Prescott modelMacroeconomic policy-makingOptimal cheating strategiesReversed Stackelberg games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Credible public policy
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversed linear-quadratic Stackelberg games
• On the cheating problem in Stackelberg games†
• Computational techniques for modelling learning in economics

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