Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
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Publication:1605450
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00576-6zbMath1131.91363OpenAlexW2151679727MaRDI QIDQ1605450
Publication date: 15 July 2002
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00576-6
Related Items (3)
Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
Cites Work
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- The solidarity axiom for quasilinear social choice problems
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Fair Net Trades
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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