Learning dynamics, genetic algorithms, and corporate takeovers

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00004-4zbMath1037.91543OpenAlexW2902223901MaRDI QIDQ1606192

Thomas H. Noe, Lynn Li

Publication date: 30 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00004-4

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfree-ridingcoordination failureshareholdersgenetic-learning algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH

This page was built for publication: Learning dynamics, genetic algorithms, and corporate takeovers