A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00128-7zbMath1031.91037OpenAlexW1997655008MaRDI QIDQ1606268

Flavio M. Menezes, Jeffrey Jude Kline

Publication date: 24 July 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00128-7

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriaEPA auctionsuniform price equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

Cites Work

• EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory evaluation
• The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
• Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games

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