Strategic bargaining with destructive power.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00160-3zbMath1036.91500OpenAlexW1507267628WikidataQ127015217 ScholiaQ127015217MaRDI QIDQ1606270

Paola Manzini

Publication date: 24 July 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00160-3

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining modeltwo-playerharming equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining ⋮ Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration ⋮ Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining

Cites Work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

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