Equilibrium uniqueness in oligopoly games with strategic complements

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00167-6zbMath1031.91072OpenAlexW2099684011WikidataQ126297947 ScholiaQ126297947MaRDI QIDQ1606273

Martin Peitz

Publication date: 24 July 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00167-6

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcontraction mapping theoremoligopoly models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Symmetry in \(n\)-player games

Cites Work

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• Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Monotone Comparative Statics

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