Pure communication between agents with close preferences.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00218-9zbMath1036.91502WikidataQ126383105 ScholiaQ126383105MaRDI QIDQ1606281

David Spector

Publication date: 24 July 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcheap-talk games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Communication between unbiased agents ⋮ Failure of communication despite close preferences ⋮ Incomplete contracts versus communication

Cites Work

• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Strategic Information Transmission

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