Weak independence and veto power.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00209-8zbMath1036.91504OpenAlexW1976909582MaRDI QIDQ1606284

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 24 July 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00209-8

zbMATH Keywords

veto powerweak independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship, Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover, Weak independence and the Pareto principle, Impossibility theorems are modified and unified, Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings, Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited, Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence, Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer, Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

• Twitching weak dictators
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Democratic preference functions
• Geometry of voting
• Nonbinary social choice for economic environments
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting