The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00224-4zbMath1026.91503OpenAlexW1976554058WikidataQ127098207 ScholiaQ127098207MaRDI QIDQ1606439

Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 1 September 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00224-4

zbMATH Keywords

Monte Carlo simulationCondorcet winnerscoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

Cites Work

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• Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
• Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
• The Borda dictionary
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• Millions of election outcomes from a single profile
• Geometry of voting
• On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
• The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
• ON THE MOMENTS OF ORDER STATISTICS IN SAMPLES FROM NORMAL POPULATIONS

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