Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.

DOI10.1016/S0898-1221(02)00109-8zbMath1037.91014OpenAlexW2054148368MaRDI QIDQ1609076

R. Smith

Publication date: 15 August 2002

Published in: Computers \& Mathematics with Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0898-1221(02)00109-8

zbMATH Keywords

automataNash equilibriumrepeated gamesnonsymmetric bimatrix gamessymmetric bimatrix games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Randomized algorithms (68W20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation costs
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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