Procurement bidding in first-price and second-price, sealed-bid auctions within the common-value paradigm

DOI10.1023/A:1015008130780zbMath1007.91506OpenAlexW1504671282MaRDI QIDQ1611375

Anders Lunander

Publication date: 21 August 2002

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1015008130780

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscommon-valueVickrey auctionprocurement bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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