Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach

DOI10.1023/A:1016308420460zbMath1007.91039OpenAlexW3124971018MaRDI QIDQ1614140

R. Smith

Publication date: 3 September 2002

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1016308420460

zbMATH Keywords

EMUfull and partial cooperationLQ dynamicgamestabilisation policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (9)

Optimal discretionary monetary and fiscal policies in a country-size heterogeneous monetary union ⋮ Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach ⋮ Stabilizability of Game-Based Control Systems ⋮ Budget balancing in a two-dimensional macroeconomic model ⋮ Operational aspect of the policy coordination for financial stability: role of Jeffreys-Lindley's paradox in operations research ⋮ A numerical algorithm to find soft-constrained Nash equilibria in scalar LQ-games ⋮ Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary union ⋮ Interactions Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Three-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union ⋮ Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union

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