A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1053-0zbMath1400.92536OpenAlexW3123870277MaRDI QIDQ1616073

David A. Hennessy, Alexander E. Saak

Publication date: 31 October 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cdm15738.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/130315/filename/130526.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

testingprivate informationinfectious diseasecheap talkpublic health agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Epidemiology (92D30) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Learning versus habit formation: optimal timing of lockdown for disease containment

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