Voting in the limelight
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1616074
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1054-zzbMath1416.91101OpenAlexW2610248138MaRDI QIDQ1616074
Publication date: 31 October 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1054-z
Related Items (3)
Privacy in implementation ⋮ Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
Cites Work
- A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
- Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
- Privacy in implementation
- Perception games and privacy
- Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
- Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
This page was built for publication: Voting in the limelight
