Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes

DOI10.1007/s00712-017-0584-yzbMath1417.91337OpenAlexW1827110301WikidataQ59612595 ScholiaQ59612595MaRDI QIDQ1616499

David R. Collie, Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date: 6 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0584-y

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect competitionoligopolytaxescartelsupergame

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes ⋮ Commodity taxes and rent extraction ⋮ Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling ⋮ Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs

Cites Work

• Consumption taxes in monopolistic competition: a comment
• A note on ad valorem and per unit taxation in an oligopoly model
• On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Pareto ranking optimal tariffs under foreign monopoly
• Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes
• Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct
• The comparison between ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
• On the Effects of Entry
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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