Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization
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Publication:1616611
DOI10.1007/s00712-017-0560-6zbMath1417.91341OpenAlexW2753134686MaRDI QIDQ1616611
João Correia-da-Silva, Joana Pinho
Publication date: 7 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0560-6
Related Items (3)
Partial privatization in an international mixed oligopoly under product differentiation ⋮ Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion? ⋮ On competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopoly
Cites Work
- Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model
- Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
- Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
- Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firm's moves: the relevance of privatization
- State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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