Revealed votes

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1116-6zbMath1417.91185OpenAlexW4233590239MaRDI QIDQ1616761

Andrei M. Gomberg

Publication date: 7 November 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1116-6

zbMATH Keywords

unanimityweighted majoritycommittee choice structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

An algebraic approach to revealed preference

Cites Work

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• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• Intuitive Probability on Finite Sets
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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