Removal and threshold pricing: truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15zbMath1415.91138OpenAlexW2888082841MaRDI QIDQ1617660

Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen

Publication date: 8 November 2018

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_15

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designdouble-sided marketmulti-dimensional playersonline advertising market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (2)

Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets ⋮ Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets

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