Mechanism design for two-opposite-facility location games with penalties on distance

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_24zbMath1415.91066arXiv1806.08057OpenAlexW2809588553MaRDI QIDQ1617675

Minming Li, Zhongzheng Tang, Xiao-Dong Hu, Xiao-Hua Jia, Xu-jin Chen, Chen-Hao Wang

Publication date: 8 November 2018

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.08057

zbMATH Keywords

facility location gamestrategy-proof mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

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