The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.004zbMath1400.91071OpenAlexW1986979647WikidataQ33346943 ScholiaQ33346943MaRDI QIDQ1617739

Casey G. Rothschild

Publication date: 8 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.wellesley.edu/economicsfaculty/9

zbMATH Keywords

group selectionreciprocal altruismhuman cooperationsapience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option

Cites Work

• The median of the Poisson distribution
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Spatial invasion of cooperation
• The shared reward dilemma
• Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication

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