Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a public good game

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2016.10.076zbMath1400.91183OpenAlexW2548927324MaRDI QIDQ1620321

Annarita Colasante

Publication date: 13 November 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10234/167153

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationsocial influencepublic good game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Public goods game with the interdependence of different cooperative strategies ⋮ Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations ⋮ Public goods game on coevolving networks driven by the similarity and difference of payoff

Cites Work

• Empirical validation of stochastic models of interacting agents
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• A calibration procedure for analyzing stock price dynamics in an agent-based framework
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

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