Statistical fluctuations in population bargaining in the ultimatum game: static and evolutionary aspects

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.017zbMath1402.91072OpenAlexW2091983343WikidataQ83979446 ScholiaQ83979446MaRDI QIDQ1620795

Roberto da Silva, Gustavo A. Kellermann, Luís C. Lamb

Publication date: 14 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.017

zbMATH Keywords

iterated game theorymathematical modelling of biological and economic systemsstatistical fluctuations in dynamical systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (6)

The evolutionary analysis of the ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision ⋮ Global oscillations in the optional public goods game under spatial diffusion ⋮ The evolution of fairness in the coevolutionary ultimatum games ⋮ Randomness and arbitrary coordination in the reactive ultimatum game ⋮ A reactive-Darwinian model for the ultimatum game: on the dominance of moderation in high diffusion ⋮ Strategies generalization and payoff fluctuation optimization in the iterated ultimatum game

Cites Work

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• Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining

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