Three-valued simple games

DOI10.1007/S11238-017-9630-ZzbMath1417.91057OpenAlexW3121613231WikidataQ59482755 ScholiaQ59482755MaRDI QIDQ1620913

Marieke Musegaas, Marieke Quant, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 14 November 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9630-z

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesShapley valuecorethree-valued simple gamestransfer propertyvital players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic programming algorithms for computing power indices in weighted multi-tier games

Cites Work

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