Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness

DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9655-yzbMath1417.91182OpenAlexW2794398111MaRDI QIDQ1620942

Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 15 November 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9655-y

zbMATH Keywords

myopiacoalition structurefarsightednesssymmetric majority game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures

Cites Work

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• The Farsighted Stable Set

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