Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations
DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9666-8zbMath1417.91037OpenAlexW2808138429MaRDI QIDQ1620947
Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Emiliya A. Lazarova
Publication date: 15 November 2018
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9666-8
noncooperative gamepartial cooperationinternational pollution abatementleadership equilibriummulti-market oligopolypartial cooperative equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Cites Work
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- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
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- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
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