Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations

DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9666-8zbMath1417.91037OpenAlexW2808138429MaRDI QIDQ1620947

Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Emiliya A. Lazarova

Publication date: 15 November 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9666-8

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamepartial cooperationinternational pollution abatementleadership equilibriummulti-market oligopolypartial cooperative equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Emergent collaboration in social purpose games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategic behavior under partial cooperation
• Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• The Bargaining Problem
• CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SYMMETRIC POTENTIAL GAMES
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points

This page was built for publication: Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations