Dictatorship on top-circular domains
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Publication:1620949
DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9667-7zbMath1417.91191OpenAlexW2755689789MaRDI QIDQ1620949
Souvik Roy, Gopakumar Achuthankutty
Publication date: 15 November 2018
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81368/1/MPRA_paper_81368.pdf
Related Items (3)
Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey
Cites Work
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- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences
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