Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
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Publication:1621724
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0636-8zbMath1417.91033OpenAlexW3125865769MaRDI QIDQ1621724
Publication date: 9 November 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0636-8
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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