Hotelling's location model with negative network externalities

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0615-0zbMath1417.91387OpenAlexW2792039322MaRDI QIDQ1621727

Dries Vermeulen, Marc Schröder, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 9 November 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/a98c1b60-d624-45ea-9aa7-f5bb3c92370e

zbMATH Keywords

network externalitiessubgame perfect Nash equilibriumHotelling's location model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (3)

General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games ⋮ Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm ⋮ Hotelling games with random tolerance intervals

Cites Work

• Equilibrium store locations when consumers minimize travel time plus waiting time
• Large Spatial Competition
• Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

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