Game theory with translucent players
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1621735
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0626-xzbMath1417.91020arXiv1308.3778OpenAlexW2963347835WikidataQ129683784 ScholiaQ129683784MaRDI QIDQ1621735
Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
Publication date: 9 November 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.3778
Related Items (2)
Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games ⋮ Multi-objective optimization of parallel manipulators using a game algorithm
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Conditional belief types
- Program equilibrium
- On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
- A commitment folk theorem
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
- Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning
- Games with espionage
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
This page was built for publication: Game theory with translucent players