Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0614-1zbMath1417.91074arXiv1607.07350OpenAlexW2516474116WikidataQ130202722 ScholiaQ130202722MaRDI QIDQ1621737

O. A. Malafeyev, Vassili N. Kolokol'tsov

Publication date: 9 November 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07350

zbMATH Keywords

social normsstable equilibriumturnpikeinspectionmean-field gamecorruptioncyber-securitydisease spreadingbotnet defense

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (4)

Control theory approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games ⋮ A myopic adjustment process for mean field games with finite state and action space ⋮ A single player and a mass of agents: A pursuit evasion-like game ⋮ Essential stationary equilibria of mean field games with finite state and action space

Cites Work

• Turnpike theorems for Markov games
• Mean-field-game model for botnet defense in cyber-security
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
• Mean field games. I: The stationary case
• Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle
• Preface: DGAA special issue on mean field games
• Mean field games models -- a brief survey
• Turnpike properties in the calculus of variations and optimal control
• Probabilistic Analysis of Mean-Field Games
• Long Time Average of Mean Field Games with a Nonlocal Coupling
• A Game-Theoretical Approach for Finding Optimal Strategies in a Botnet Defense Model
• The Evolutionary Game of Pressure (or Interference), Resistance and Collaboration
• The Theorems of Bony and Brezis on Flow-Invariant Sets
• Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Theory

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