Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
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Publication:1621738
DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0595-5zbMath1417.91120OpenAlexW2760577801MaRDI QIDQ1621738
Publication date: 9 November 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6dk22157
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