Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting

DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2436-0zbMath1417.91412OpenAlexW2588390336MaRDI QIDQ1622040

Chengyuan Wang, Biao Luo, Tie-Shan Li

Publication date: 12 November 2018

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2436-0

zbMATH Keywords

social networksinequity aversionoperating systemsbehavioral agency modeldeserved concerns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Related Items (1)

Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

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