Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders

DOI10.1007/s10479-017-2475-6zbMath1417.91249OpenAlexW2605412090MaRDI QIDQ1622049

Qi An, Shu-Cherng Fang, Xingwei Wang, Min Huang, Xiaohu Qian

Publication date: 12 November 2018

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2475-6

zbMATH Keywords

reserve priceanticipated regretsmitigation strategyreverse auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Winner determination with sustainable-flexible considerations under demand uncertainty in transportation service procurement auctions ⋮ Selecting green third party logistics providers for a loss-averse fourth party logistics provider in a multiattribute reverse auction ⋮ Efficient Multi-Attribute Auctions Considering Supply Disruption ⋮ Optimal digital product auctions with unlimited supply and rebidding behavior

Cites Work

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• Application of multi-dimensional procurement auction in single-period inventory models
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Auctioning Supply Contracts
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
• Optimal Auction Design

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