Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.016zbMath1417.91161OpenAlexW2787648084MaRDI QIDQ1622352

Rohan Dutta, David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www1.unipa.it/modica/TwoMastersPublished.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

groupcommon agencycoalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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