An efficient ascending auction for private valuations

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005zbMath1417.91226OpenAlexW2883804650WikidataQ129488366 ScholiaQ129488366MaRDI QIDQ1622372

Oleg Baranov

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionsiterative auctionscombinatorial auctionsdynamic auctionsVickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands

Cites Work

• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The package assignment model.
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
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