Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
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Publication:1622381
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.009zbMath1417.91196OpenAlexW2885061541WikidataQ129427003 ScholiaQ129427003MaRDI QIDQ1622381
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1091507
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