Coalition-proof full efficient implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.009zbMath1417.91196OpenAlexW2885061541WikidataQ129427003 ScholiaQ129427003MaRDI QIDQ1622381

Mikhail Safronov

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1091507

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcoalition-proofnessfull implementationinternalizing externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Robust coalitional implementation

Cites Work

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