The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002zbMath1417.91293OpenAlexW3122933663MaRDI QIDQ1622384

Tadashi Hashimoto

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectations equilibriuminformation aggregationrandom allocationrandom prioritylarge marketex post incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Welfare-preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC transformation with negligible revenue loss ⋮ Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets

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