Dynamic persuasion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.007zbMath1417.91163OpenAlexW4243904524MaRDI QIDQ1622438

Takakazu Honryo

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

communicationdynamicspersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games ⋮ Optimal dynamic information provision ⋮ Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?

Cites Work

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