Large strategic dynamic interactions
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Publication:1622439
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001zbMath1417.91082OpenAlexW2889485516WikidataQ129336437 ScholiaQ129336437MaRDI QIDQ1622439
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001
Related Items (3)
Robust perfect equilibrium in large games ⋮ Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games ⋮ Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
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