Large strategic dynamic interactions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001zbMath1417.91082OpenAlexW2889485516WikidataQ129336437 ScholiaQ129336437MaRDI QIDQ1622439

Eran Shmaya, Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gameslarge gamesBayesian equilibriumanonymous gamesMarkov equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Robust perfect equilibrium in large games ⋮ Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games ⋮ Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk

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