Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.001zbMath1417.91036OpenAlexW2889758541WikidataQ129240102 ScholiaQ129240102MaRDI QIDQ1622441

André Casajus

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryTU gameweighted Shapley valuesweak differential marginalitymutual dependencesuperweak differential marginality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (6)

Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution ⋮ Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values

Cites Work

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• Potentials in cooperative TU-games
• Conservation of energy in value theory
• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
• Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
• Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
• On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
• Weighted weak semivalues
• Potential, Value, and Consistency

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