Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values
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Publication:1622441
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.001zbMath1417.91036OpenAlexW2889758541WikidataQ129240102 ScholiaQ129240102MaRDI QIDQ1622441
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.001
symmetryTU gameweighted Shapley valuesweak differential marginalitymutual dependencesuperweak differential marginality
Related Items (6)
Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution ⋮ Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
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- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
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- Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
- Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
- On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
- Weighted weak semivalues
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
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