Financial contracting with enforcement externalities

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.09.002zbMath1417.91539OpenAlexW2185150822WikidataQ129253747 ScholiaQ129253747MaRDI QIDQ1622445

Ricardo Serrano-Padial, Lukasz A. Drozd

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2015/paper_1362.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneityglobal gamescredit cyclescredit crunchcontract enforcementdefault spillovers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Tax Riots
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Pecuniary Externalities in Economies with Financial Frictions
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

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