Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1622452
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.009zbMath1417.91085OpenAlexW2894460739MaRDI QIDQ1622452
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0a97506e-e932-4e3d-b272-df9b5cc5e2ff
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A generalization of the ``maximum theorem
- On strategic stability in discontinuous games
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
- On evolutionarily stable sets
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- A generalized theorem of the maximum
- Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
- From evolutionary to strategic stability.
- Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
- Stability and the chain store paradox
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
