Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1622453
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.001zbMath1417.91128OpenAlexW2894551741WikidataQ129091100 ScholiaQ129091100MaRDI QIDQ1622453
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2208
linear programmingmechanism designrobust mechanism designduality approachdominant-strategy mechanismsmaxmin foundation
Related Items
Correlation-robust auction design ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism ⋮ No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors ⋮ When Walras meets Vickrey ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms ⋮ Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
- Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- Price discrimination through communication
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
- An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
- On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
