The signaling effect of raising inflation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.10.007zbMath1417.91373OpenAlexW3125983544WikidataQ129085887 ScholiaQ129085887MaRDI QIDQ1622462

Y. Aharonov

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/713kqq1pgu80lr8fn0lsuuh8lf/resources/wp-2016-06-barthelemy-mengus-signaling-effect.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signalinginflationreputationforward guidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Credible forward guidance

Cites Work

• Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Equilibrium and government commitment
• Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
• The Optimal Inflation Rate in New Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise Their Inflation Targets in Light of the Zero Lower Bound?
• A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

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