Bertrand competition under network externalities

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.006zbMath1417.91208OpenAlexW3124588278WikidataQ129092377 ScholiaQ129092377MaRDI QIDQ1622463

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

price discriminationdivide and conquertwo-sided marketslocal externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (5)

The network structure of innovation networks ⋮ Bundling and pricing decisions for bricks-and-clicks firms with consideration of network externality ⋮ The impact of network topology and market structure on pricing ⋮ Competitive pricing under local network effects ⋮ Duopoly Competition with Network Effects in Discrete Choice Models

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information
• Trading networks with price-setting agents
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Overcoming the coordination problem: dynamic formation of networks
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Pricing in social networks
• Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects
• Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Pricing Network Effects

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